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Individual bacterial cells can communicate via quorum
sensing, cooperate to harvest nutrients from their environ-
ment, form multicellular biofilms, compete over resources
and even kill one another. When the environment that
bacteria inhabit is an animal host, these social behaviours
mediate virulence. Over the last decade, much attention
has focussed on the ecology, evolution and pathology of
bacterial cooperation, and the possibility that it could be
exploited or destabilised to treat infections. But how far
can we really extrapolate from theoretical predictions and
laboratory experiments to make inferences about ‘cooper-
ative’ behaviours in hosts and reservoirs? To determine
the likely importance and evolution of cooperation ‘in the
wild’, several questions must be addressed. A recent
paper that reports the dynamics of bacterial cooperation
and virulence in a field experiment provides an excellent
nucleus for bringing together key empirical and theoreti-
cal results which help us to frame – if not completely to
answer – these questions.
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Introduction: Why study the social lives of
bacteria?
Any behaviour that benefits another individual or individuals,
andwhich is selected for at least in part because of this benefit, is
classed as cooperation [1]. In bacteria, many exoproducts can be
seen as cooperative – perhaps the best known includemolecules
that harvest nutrients (such as elastase [2] and iron-scavenging
siderophores [3]), biofilm polymers [4, 5] and exotoxins (such as
botulinum, anthrax and Shiga and cholera toxins [6]). These all
represent ‘public goods’ whose benefits can be enjoyed not just
by the producing cells, but potentially by other cells in the
vicinity regardless of their own level of production. As these
molecules are metabolically costly to produce, populations of
cooperating bacteria are open to exploitation by ‘cheating’
mutants, who enjoy the fruits of their neighbours’ efforts but
pay none of the associated costs [4, 7–11]. This situation mirrors
that in many animal species, where behaviours such as co-
operative breeding, predator mobbing, and alarm calling confer
shared benefits but entail temptations to defect [12].
How, when and why natural selection favours the evol-
ution and maintenance of cooperation despite the advantages
of cheating are therefore key questions in biology, and have
received a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention
(synthesised in [12–15]). Bacteria are tractable model systems
for testing ecological and evolutionary hypotheses about
cooperation, but microbiologists are also interested in bac-
terial sociality in its own right because it often determines
virulence (parasite-induced harm). For instance, siderophores
are a necessary virulence factor in acute infections of the human
opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa [8, 16], bio-
films confer enhanced resistance to antibiotics and host
immune attack [17] and exotoxins are often necessary for
successful colonisation of hosts – the Cry toxin of the insect
pathogen Bacillus thuringiensis, for example, induces pore
formation in gut epithelial cells, facilitating invasion of the
host haemocoel (the body cavity, containing a mixture of
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blood, lymph and interstitial fluid) [18]. Consequently, under-
standing the evolution of cooperation may improve our under-
standing of the evolution of pathogen virulence and suggest
novel ways of treating bacterial infection [19, 20]. For example,
it has been suggested that cheating mutants could be used as
‘Trojan horses’ [21]. By avoiding the costs of cooperation,
cheating mutants can gain a fitness advantage over coopera-
tors and increase in frequency until they dominate popu-
lations; inoculating infected hosts with engineered cheats
could therefore lead to a predominance of cheats in the infec-
tion and reduced virulence; moreover, the cheats could be
engineered to carry useful alleles (e.g. antibiotic suscepti-
bility), which would hitch-hike to high frequency and so
render the infection more susceptible to traditional prophy-
laxis. However, in order for this approach to work, we must be
sure that the environment and population structure of the
target pathogen is such that cheats can invade the population
to a sufficiently high level to allow clearance upon adminis-
tration of antibiotics.
How cooperation evolves
What, then, do we know about the ecological conditions that
favour cooperation versus cheating? Significant advances
have been made in this field, mainly relying on concepts
rooted in inclusive fitness theory [14, 22, 23]. Inclusive fitness
theory tells us that cooperation can be favoured in two non-
mutually exclusive ways. First, over an individual’s lifetime,
cooperation can bring benefits that outweigh its short-term
cost and cause a net increase in direct fitness (the individual
leaves more offspring). For instance, cooperation may make
an individual more likely to benefit from the cooperative acts
of others [24], or may bring benefits via its ecological effects.
One way this can happen in patch-structured populations
(where the population is divided among discrete, localised
patches of habitat) is if cooperation increases group size and
the probability of an individual leaving descendants is a
positive function of local group size, i.e. in a metapopulation
where competition occurs mainly between patches [7, 22, 25].
Second, if the beneficiaries of cooperation tend also to carry
cooperative alleles, then they will leave more offspring; in this
way, cooperative alleles increase in frequency regardless of
the direct cost to the actor, whose indirect fitness is thus
increased [7, 22]. This can occur actively, through reciprocity
or through preferential targeting of cooperation towards
relatives [26] or individuals who carry distinctive phenotypic
markers of cooperation (‘greenbeards’: [27–29]), or passively
through indiscriminate cooperation in conditions that tend to
keep relatives together, such as limited dispersal between
habitat patches, or dispersal in groups of relatives [25, 30–
33]. It is likely that the early emergence of cooperation relies on
indirect fitness benefits resulting from high relatedness, or on
direct benefits that accrue because the interests of the indi-
vidual and group are aligned (e.g. if between-patch compe-
tition is more intense than within-patch competition). Later,
the emergence of reciprocity, greenbeards, kin discrimination
and policing mechanisms can act to maintain cooperation
even if ecological or demographic change means that these
early conditions are no longer met.
In order to determine whether bacterial behaviours shown to
be cooperative in laboratory experiments are relevant to
pathogen ecology, evolution and virulence in the wild, we
must therefore ask three questions. First, is the behaviour
really cooperative in hosts and/or reservoirs? Second, is
natural population structure likely to favour cooperation or
cheating? Finally, how do other selection pressures acting
within hosts and/or reservoirs affect selection on cooperation?
Are bacteria really cooperative in hosts
and/or reservoirs?
Microbiologists know that it is not always easy to determine
whether the phenotypes we see expressed by bacteria in the
laboratory reflect those expressed inside a natural host. The
chemical composition of the environment, temperature and
growth mode (e.g. planktonic vs. surface-attached) all affect
bacterial physiology and cue specific patterns of gene expres-
sion [34–37]. When considering social traits, the situation
becomes more difficult: not only must we ask whether this
trait is expressed inside a host and whether it really aids
persistence, we also have to ask whether the trait is actually
still cooperative in this environment.
For instance, it is plausible that experiments in liquid
growth medium allow cheats much greater access to diffusible
public goods than they experience in nature. In chronic lung
infections of people with cystic fibrosis, P. aeruginosa inhabits
viscous, adhesive mucus, which likely retards the diffusion of
secreted molecules. In the lab, increasing the viscosity of
experimental growth medium and so retarding both cell
migration and public goods diffusion prevents cheating
mutants from overwhelming siderophore-producing popu-
lations of P. aeruginosa [30]. It seems likely that this is par-
tially due to siderophores being retained more closely in the
vicinity of producing cells, i.e. siderophore production
becomes less cooperative and more selfish as viscosity
increases [30, 38]. Such shifting of a trait’s effect from the
group to the individual will dramatically alter how natural
selection acts upon it.
In a recent study, Raymond et al. [39] conducted a field
experiment to determine whether B. thuringiensis Cry toxin
truly represents a public good in semi-natural conditions. By
inoculating a plot of cabbage plants with varying ratios of Cryþ
and Cry spores, at a range of total densities, releasing host
diamondback moth (Plutella xylostella) larvae onto the plants
and recovering spores from cabbage leaves at intervals over a
56-day period, Raymond et al. were able to study the evol-
utionary dynamics of Cry production. Crucially, after initial
inoculation, transmission of bacteria between hosts was
allowed to occur naturally. This contrasts markedly with
previous work on the evolution of cooperation, in which
dispersal between environmental patches or transmission
between hosts is controlled by the experimenter and exper-
imental hosts are essentially treated as rather advanced test
tubes. Raymond et al. found that the Cry toxin is just as social
in the field as it is in the lab: in both settings, the proportion of
Cry spores increases over the course of infection, demon-
strating that non-producers can gain access to the haemocoel
....Prospects & Overviews F. Harrison












and grow inside the host at the expense of the producer
cells. Further, as we would expect for a public good that
enhances population growth [40], this advantage of cheating
is negatively frequency-dependent: the more cheats there are
present, the less Cry is available for cheats to exploit and the
worse they do.
Is natural population structure likely to
favour cooperation or cheating?
The answer to this question depends on several variables,
including but not limited to: multiplicity of infection (Are
hosts infected by single clones or multiple genotypes?),
resource supply within infected hosts (How necessary is
cooperation for growth?), the relationship between virulence
and transmission (How does growth rate or yield within
a host affect transmission probability?), host population
structure (How frequent are opportunities for transmission?)
and transmission mode (direct or via an environmental
reservoir, where population structure may differ from that
in hosts). Taking these factors into account can produce
very different predictions of the evolution of virulence than
those resulting from simple laboratory experiments [41].
Moreover, extensive theoretical work illustrates how both
pathogen and host population structure mediate selection
for virulence (e.g. [42]); if virulence is determined by coopera-
tion, these variables will by necessity also affect pathogen
sociality.
In their study, Raymond et al. [39] showed that Cry co-
operators and cheats both persisted in the population over
56 days of natural transmission and evolution, albeit with
cooperators in the minority (Fig. 1). Coexistence was partially
due to a negative correlation between relative fitness and
relative frequency for both genotypes, but Raymond et al.,
showed that this was reinforced by a further level of self-
regulation: the presence of cheats reduces overall population
growth, but cooperators gain an extra fitness advantage at
low density and this helps them ‘bounce back’ from cheat
invasion. (It should, however, be noted that these relation-
ships break down when only very small numbers of cooper-
ators are present, as a threshold amount of Cry is required to
rupture the host gut and allow access to the haemocoel.)
Further, over the 56 days, population-level relatedness
remained high (Fig. 1) and the distribution of bacteria on
leaves was highly aggregated. Thus, two demographic con-
ditions necessary for cooperation – high relatedness and
patch structure – were maintained in this semi-natural
system.
How do other selection pressures acting
within hosts and/or reservoirs affect
selection on cooperation?
Finally, we must recognise that selection on other traits can
mediate the evolution of a cooperative behaviour of interest.
For instance, the invasion of a population of cooperators by a
novel cheating mutant (or vice versa) could be curtailed
under strong selection for non-social traits, simply because
mutations favourable under the non-social selection pressure
are more likely to arise in a cooperator cell, as their popu-
lation size is so much larger. This was recently demonstrated
by Morgan et al. [43], who added bacteriophage to mixed
populations of wild-type Pseudomonas fluorescens and
an isogenic mutant that does not produce the siderophore
pyoverdine. Conditions were such that siderophores were
beneficial (iron was limiting) and accessible to cheats (liquid
growth medium allows free diffusion of siderophores),
and cooperation was not under positive social selection
(competition was entirely within-patch). The relative fitness
advantage of cheating was reduced by the presence of phage
over a range of initial cheat frequencies; from an initial
frequency of 1%, cheats could successfully invade in the
absence of phage but were outcompeted by cooperators
when phage were added. In the presence of phage, clonal
interference between strongly favoured phage resistance
and weakly favoured social cheating placed rare cheats
at a disadvantage, as they were less likely to also carry
resistance mutations.
This is not the only way in which selection on non-
social traits can affect the evolution of cooperation: my
own work has shown that selection for hypermutability – a
phenotype often observed in infections due to immune
activity and prophylaxis [44] – can accelerate the breakdown
of cooperation, as hypermutable clones are more likely to
generate cheating mutants, have increased access to high-
fitness cheating genotypes and reduce within-population
relatedness [45, 46]. Finally, pleiotropy can mean that cheat-
ing incurs a cost because it has deleterious effects on a second
behaviour necessary for growth or persistence. One example
of this is the poor ability of siderophore-deficient cheats of
P. aeruginosa to form biofilms [47, 48]; this could help to
maintain siderophore cooperation when both siderophores
and biofilm are beneficial.
Figure 1. Population-level relatedness (solid line) remained high over
the course of evolution in Raymond et al.’s semi-natural experimental
plot. High relatedness is predicted by theory to maintain cooperation;
Cry producers (dashed line) did indeed persist in this experiment.
(Redrawn from Fig. 4B in [39] with permission from AAAS.)
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Conclusion: Taking results from the lab
into the wild. . . and into the clinic?
Raymond et al.’s study showed that the social dynamics
of Cry toxin production in a semi-natural field system
recapitulated those observed in more strictly controlled
laboratory conditions. More importantly, they demonstrated
the continued coexistence of cooperators and cheats over
many bacterial generations with natural transmission
between hosts. However, to facilitate their experiment the
authors excluded herbivores and natural predators of the
insect host from their experimental plot; the effects of
these on host population dynamics, transmission and bac-
terial population structure were therefore not investigated.
Despite the exclusion of predators, the host population
crashed towards the end of the experiment and more larvae
were released; it is therefore unclear how well normal host
population dynamics were captured. These caveats aside,
researchers studying the links between pathogen cooperation
and virulence should look to this study as an excellent
example of what can be gained by studying microbial sociality
outside the laboratory.
What light, then, do Raymond et al.’s results shed on the
potential for exploiting bacterial cooperation for prophylactic
benefit? In this particular case, both cooperators and cheats
persisted in the population – unlike experiments which
cleanly manipulate ecological variables in the lab (e.g. [7]),
neither genotype achieved fixation and cooperators gained an
extra fitness advantage at low density. It is therefore unlikely
that releasing large numbers of cheats into this system would
cause a severe and terminal population crash, because coop-
erator clones have the capacity to recover from low density,
cheat-dominated populations. This also has implications for
the Trojan horse strategy, which relies on Trojan cheats
sweeping to sufficiently high frequency that their removal
represents a severe population crash: whether this could
happen in Raymond et al.’s system is really not clear as
cooperators were maintained at approx. 10–25% of the popu-
lation. Finally, Raymond et al. did not address the extent and
effects of coevolution between cooperators and cheats –
although clones saved from their study could be used to
explore this in future work. As in any antagonistic interaction,
there exists the capacity for an ‘arms race’ to develop, whereby
cooperators evolve to resist cheating and cheats evolve to
better exploit cooperators (this has been shown empirically
for biofilm formation in P. fluorescens: [49]). If engineered
cheats are to be used to destabilise infection populations,
we must be sure that they retain the ability to coevolve with
cooperators and do not fall behind in the arms race. Further, if
social traits are encoded by mobile plasmids (as Cry toxins can
be), then horizontal transmission can convert cheats to coop-
erators – the implications of this for the evolution of coopera-
tion, and by extension for the Trojan horse strategy, have
begun to be addressed by other authors [50–52].
More generally, it should be stressed that while much
research has sought to explain how population structure
affects selection for cooperation, remarkably little attention
has focussed on how cooperation affects population structure.
Three recent theoretical papers have suggested that selection
for cooperation can concomitantly drive the evolution of
population structures that support cooperation, reinforcing
sociality via a positive feedback loop. Powers et al. [53] suggest
that selection for cooperation can generate linkage disequili-
brium between cooperative alleles and alleles that predispose
the bearer to group living, while Van Dyken and Wade [54]
explore how changes in levels of cooperation can affect the
scale of resource competition. Further, Bonsall andWright [55]
show how cooperation can facilitate the evolution of resource
specialisation, presumably limiting within-group competition.
The exploration of possible bidirectional links between
changes in population structure and relative benefits of
cooperation would add enormous value to social evolution
research in general, and research into the coevolution of
microbial cooperation, virulence and epidemiology in particu-
lar. This has been alluded to in one guise in recent literature:
the possible link between virulence factors as public goods
and pathogen infective dose.
Pathogens that rely on virulence factors that act at a
distance from the producing cell, and so are likely to function
as public goods, tend to have a higher minimum infective
dose than pathogens that use locally acting molecules (e.g.
those injected directly into host cells) [56, 57]; while the
implications of this for virulence evolution are not clear
cut, it is interesting that reliance on a potentially cooperative
behaviour for virulence should place restrictions on the size of
the bottleneck experienced at transmission. It is conceivable
that placing a lower limit on the number of cells required to
initiate infection could make clonal infection less likely and so
make the presence of cheats in the population inevitable;
however, it is equally conceivable that this could select for
transmission via groups of related cells and so reinforce
cooperation.
Closing Remarks
Laboratory experiments have revealed the complexity of bac-
terial sociality, and the finding that various virulence factors
are in fact cooperatively produced ‘public goods’ has spurred
researchers on to suggest how we might exploit this for pro-
phylactic gains. Given this, it is vital that we determine how
well cooperation in the lab mimics the real situation in natural
hosts and reservoirs. In order to do this, we must explicitly
define and address a set of specific questions about the
ecology and epidemiology of the pathogen under consider-
ation. By exploring changes in cooperation and relatedness in
a field experiment with a pathogenic bacterium, Raymond
et al. help to frame these questions and set an example
for future experimental work outside the confines of the
laboratory.
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